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IN T'1'E SUP REillE COURT 
OF T~ STATE OF UTA-q 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., a 
municipal corporation of 
t~e State of Uta~, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
D. WILLIA.ii LAYTON and 
'1ELEN LAYTON, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Case No. 16128 
APPELL4.NT 1 S REPLY BRIEF 
1. ~ere is really no question as to ~e facts 
a1mitted by t~e City on page 3 and 4 of t~eir brief, except 
number 5. ~is is in error as Blocks 2 and 4 of appellant's 
property are now and ~ave always been in Salt Lake County. 
(See tax notices) 
2. ~ere is no need for a factual ~earing. It is a 
si.uiple .lilll. tter <Df:..'addi tion--1897 plus 5 years equals 1902. 
Sectionsil34,ll35, and•l37, Cl-,apter 2, Revised Statutes 
of Uta~ 1898 required County Commissioners and supervisors 
to keep a record of monies~expendej on public roads. Since 
t\.,e City failed to s~ow any amount from t~ese reocrds spent 
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on t"'is portion, or any portion of "Pearl Street'' for that 
period of time and appellant found no record ei t'l-. er, tnere-
fore the City failed to make a prima facia case as to the 
public riP;"'t or equity to "Pearl Street". 
0. Defendant-appellants are at a loss to understand 
"'ow on t"'e one "'and in point 7 of tl-teir statement o+acts, 
t"'e City maintains that because the Sout....,ern portion still 
appears on official maps of Salt Lake County, it gives thelll 
gooaf i tle to it, yet in anotl-.er case before t'l-. is Cotr t and 
ot....,ers, namely Salt Lake City vs. D. Wm.. Layton #222264, 
even thoogh the road there is clearly sh own on plat maps 
on f'ile in the United States Land Of'fice in Salt LakeCity 
tor section 2, & 3, Township l Soutli. Range 2 :Sast SLl3&M, 
and tl-ie Congress of the United states passed a statute at 
large in 1914 preserving tlie rigl-tts to ~e road, tre City 
in t'-at case denie ,that Layton i,as a rig""t to t""at road, 
yet now says t"'ey "'ave a rig"'t to t"'is one. 
4. Respon::lents argument, Point I -- At t,.,e top of 
page 8 of respondent's brief, a quote from t""e law ,.,as been 
underlined except t"'e following sentence: 
~ •• provided, tl-iat a road not used for a period of 
five years ceases to be a '"'ig"'wayn. 
'!"ie words or worked were omitted after used. T,.,is 
provides a distinction as to whether private of public rights 
are involved. qowever, once t'"'is road has ceased to be, 
it is a dead issue and cannot be broug"'t back to life 75 
years later. 
2 1 
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5. Case law clearly illustrates t1-.e conditions w"'ich 
made necessary t"'e passage of ti-.e provision found at tt--e 
top of page 10. Appellants contend tnat t"'ey do not apply 
w"'en one P3 rty owns all t"'e land in the subdivided section. 
6. T"'e statement found near t"'e bottom of page 10: 
"T"'is dedication occurred under the operation otlstatu-
tory law and not the operation of common law prI~ciples 
reflected by the statutes relating to hig"'ways as urged 
by appellants Layton." 
T"iis would surely be governed by the general rules under 
C'liapter 25 ( 'R'ietiways) or else be in conflict wi ti., t"'e con-
stitutional provision--"If t"'ere is a general rule, ti.,ere 
is no need for a specific one".(Art. VI Sec. 26, Mo. 12) 
Neither t"'e public nor any privatefarty i-.as acquired 
any rig"'ts to ~e "street" w,.,ic"' would allow ti-.e Court to 
interfere with defendant-appellant 1 s peaceful possession 
7. From t,.,e argument set fort"' in Point II wi.,ich uses 
the word determinable and cites the case of 'N"'ite v Salt Lake 
City, 121 U 134, it is apparent that t,.,ere is a great 
difference between t"'e facts in t1-.at case and t"'e one we 
are now di. scussing. In ti-le iV'"'ite case t1-.e street "'ad been 
in use for years, the use was for t,.,e publ ic--a water line 
under a main street, t"'ere was no question of non-use and 
claims being barred by t"'e 5 year provision. In the present 
case no one but ti-le Laytons have usel t"'e street, the 
proposed use is a speculative use by a non-contributor, 
and as t"'ere is no record of any use·~ t"'e self-executing 
3 
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provision of Section 1116 Laws of Utai., 1898, is in effect, 
Point II ignores t'"'e f'act that t'"'ere were t'"'ree separati 
ways set forth in t"-e law for ti..,e vacation of streets in 
1902. 
8. Point III tries to circumvent the fact t'"'at t\.ie 
5-yea.r non use provision was in full force and effect until 
1911 when it was cl'i anged py ~the legislature. 
Also, the statement on page 17 which says: 
11It is interesting to note t'"'at eaci.., of t'"'e above 
mentioned Utah cases imply the public's interest in 
subdivision streets would not be subject to abandon-
ment if they had been a City street". 
I 
I T'his holding is clearly against t'"'e constitutional pro.· 
'"'ibition of Article VI, Section 26, No. 12 as follows: 
"T'°'e Legislature is pro'hibi ted from enacting any 
private or special laws in t'"'e following cases: 
••• 12. In~rporating cities, towns or villages; 
c'"'anging or a.:nending the charter of any city, town~ 
village; laying out, opening, vacating or alterin~ 
town plats hi hwa s streets wards alle s or 
pu c grounds. lemphasis added 
9. On t'"'e top ofpage 21 is found: 
"T'"'ey reaped t'"'e benefits of that formal subdivision 
platting and likewise, are bound by ti.-e consequences 
and provisions selected". 
Appellantf.ayton a.re at a loss to know '"'aw on one 
hand respondents say on page 21 line 9 that t'"'ey paid no 
taxes on the street that wasn't ti.,ere, were taxed as if it 
were and now find themselves to be "reaping ~e benefits" 
of '"'aving the neighboring non-contributor owner, forcing 
4 
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t"'e appellants to let them use part of t"1er lend, and having 
to defend t"1eir rig"1ts to it in court when t"'ere has been 
no public need shown for this small area w"1atsoever. As 
far as t"1e public investment goes, whicn is mentioned in 
t""e middle paragraph ofpage 21, t'here sh.ply was none. I 
am ~ t'hat tne ubiquitous "reasonable" man w"1o snould be 
so everywhere present in legal forums, would never believe 
tnat lots are not taxed at a 'higher rate t'han acreage to 
make up for the difference. 
10. Point IV on page 22 at the bottom of the page ha.s 
tne following statement: 
nin 1902, only a dlai~ would "'ave existed--not a 
self-executing vested rignt. After 1911, t""e five 
year "non-use" provision was completely e li.Jlina ted 
and any unexercised claim was extinguis"'ed, in a 
statutory provision similar to establis"'ment of a 
Statute of limitations". 
Let us go back to 1902 for a moment. At t"1at tir:l.e, 
w"1at rignt or claim would t"'e public "'ave had? }.Tone--
no use, no monies expended, no need, no reason for puplic 
authorities to have pursued tne matter at all. ~ow now 
could t"iese empty claims come back to life 75 years later? 
If they were barred then, they would certainly be barred 
now. 
In Point IV #2, tne last line says: 
"Furthermore the developer sold lots and i.aproved·-
, " the nortn portion of Pear1~street • 
'r"'a t simnly is not true. 'l""e northern portion of the 
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street was not improved until after appellants Layton owned 
the land. It was done at the direction of and wit" t"e 
agreement of both ~ e appellant and the County Road 
authorities in t"ie middle 1950 1 s. The City was still 
more than 10 years in the future. If ever t"ere was an 
applicable place for t'he doctrine of la c'hes it is now 
and to be use+gainst t"he respondent. 
In Point IV #3. To make a distinction between County 
streets and City streets clearly is in violation of 
Article VI, Sec. 26, #12 Constitution of t"e State of Utah, 
Point IV #4. T'-ie respondent once again alleges t"at 
appellant ha..s received "all of t"'e benefits t"'at came frow 
the subdivision platting itself" on page 24, yet lists not 
one. Appellant intends to develop the area under one owner-
ship and with only one purpose in mind; t'h at is, to achieve 
t"'e greatest good for t"ia whole area and to fully utilize 
t"'e railroad on the South, t'he road on the West ( 1045 West) 
and 17th South on t 1'-e North. 
Point IV #5. There is not'IJing stopping the abutting 
land owner on the east of appellants property frM developint 
his own lot just as all the property owners in '.tuayle Street 
have devel9ped their similar lots. 
Point IV #6. This case is here to decide a non-con-
tri butor' s rights to a proposed, by never user(segrnent of 
a street. This street goes now"'ere, as t"'e railroad preventi 
its extension to t'he sout'i. We do not "'"' ve to try all 1;\'e 
troubles of the world in t'-is one case. 
6 l 
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Point V or. page 27 line 8 (this is ~issouri not Kansas), 
there is an adnission shown below by t'-e respondent that 
appellants are right, and COilll!lOn sense, if there be a :il.st-
incti on between i ~and common law, would have prevented t'iis 
Jlatter from achievi~ its present form and size. 
There was and is no common chain of title with the 
dedicator. 
The statement by the respondent City on line 21 of 
page 27: 
''In a case w,.,ere a butting property owners do not s1iare 
a common ci.,ain of title with the dedicator, then 
non-contributors gain nothing from t'lie vacation". 
The balance of the above stateine nt <D ncerns private 
rights w'liich as stated on page 28: 
"This !I'S. tter is not in controversy an:i t'"e Court 
'lias no jurisdiction over that issue where the owner 
is not a party of t,.,is litigation". 
T'lie Court can take judicial notice that Cannon Sub. 
was recorded arrl it~ d different parties entirely. 
It follows that if the non-contributors gain nothing 
by t'lie vacation, then the respondent City has nothing to 
base its claim upon, an1i-ts annexation is in error an:i is 
void in this instance. 
cm: CID s ION 
It is for certain that t'lie laws of Utah were in opera-
tion during the period of 1897 t'lirough 1911 and th at inas-
muc'" as t'"'ere has been no evidence produced t'"at ei t'"er 
public or private use was made of the property in question, 
7 
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and ti.. ere was no evidence pro ch ced by the respondent City 
that public money had ever been expended on i~proving tre 
plot in question, it is safe to conclude t"'at the soutloern 
portion of Pearl Street comes within t"'e provision, "ti-lat 
a road not used, or worked for a period of five years 
ceases to be a hig'li.way" and that it reverted to t"'e succes3or1 
of the original dedicator. 
1. The appellant's claim to the disputed land ::t> ould 
be upheld. 
2. T'ie respondent is bou..'l'ld by ti..e effects of t"'e 1698 
provision relating to 5 years non-ues just t\.ie same 
as appellants are entitled to 11-e protection of 
t...,e operation of the laws. 
3. T...,e fact that th is case could be broug...,t before 
the court violates the spirit of the ·doctrine 
of stare decisis. 
4. The only way this case can be fairly before the 
Court is on the question of t"'e contributors rights. 
Appellants cite t"'e oo nsti tu ti on al nandate w"'ich 
appears 1n Article VIII Sec. 22. 
"District judges may, at any time, report 
defects and omissions in t"'e law to tl-e SupreJ11e 
Court, and tlie Supreme Court, on or before 
t'lie first day ofDecember of each year, s"'all 
report in writing to t"'e Governor any seeming 
defect or omission in the law". 
t 1 t t"'e wheel. Eac"' generation does not have o re nven 
5. 'l""e conflict between Title 25 P"ig"'ways, Section 
1114-1120, Laws of Uta"' 1898, and C"'ap. 6 Real Estate, LaWS 
of Utah 1898, must be resolved in lig"'t of t"'e Constitution 
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of Utah Art. VI, Sec. 26, #12 w'hi"' pro""ibits t,.,e legisla-
ture from enactiq; any private or sped. al laws in the 
following cases: No. 12: 
"'Laying out, opening, vacating or altering town 
plats, hig'hways, streets wards alleys, or public 
grounds. 11 ' ' 
6. Whereas there was no evidence presented to the 
Court concerning public need and it was repeated 
throug""out respondent 1 s brief t»at t""e adjoining 
land "'older would benefit from the openir~ of 
Pearl Street, it becomes clearly evident th at 
the City by attacking appellant, is defending the 
adjoining land owner and attempting to circumvent 
the pr ohibi ti on contained in #16 of the above set 
forth section which pro"'ibits granting to an 
individual, association or corporation any 
privilege, immunity or franc"'ise. 
T""e resporrlent City could not be here were it not for 
the fact t,.,at the appellant 1 s neighbor to the east annexed 
to the City. Like it or not, t"'ey are both riding the 
same horse. 
In lig'ht of t"'e facts w"'ioh are admitted by b?t"' sides, 
it seems t"'a t the respondent City should submit t» at the 
principles of equity and public policy, lact-es, and estoppal 
be used agatnst-t~em. 
In closing, appellants ask t"iat the lower Court's 
order be reversed, ti.,at a new addition be added to t~e U.C •. L 
concerning non-contributors rights, and t"'at appellants 
claiills be confirme~ so t.,.,at proper utilization_ can be made Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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of the area so as to en'li.ance and increase t"'e use of the 
Jordan River Parkway and the other :a rge open spaces the 
City "'as to tlie west. 
Respectively Submitted, 
JJewi -:Po-a~ 
Don Layton 
Mailed 2 copies of Reply brief this date to Judy Lever, 
Assistant City Attorney. June 8, 1979 • 
k ~--(;;:; 
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